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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
HOMESTEAD-INTEREST OF WIDOW IN PROCEEDS OF HOME-
STEAD WHERE SOLD IN COURSE OF ADMINISTRATION
When a homestead is sold during the course of administration, the
question naturally arises as to the rights of the widow as well as those
of the remaindermen in the proceeds. Initially it is well to define the
concept of homestead. The Wisconsin supreme court in Bunker vs.
Lock e' stated that its chief characteristic is that it is the land where the
dwelling of the owner is located. This is what the legislatures of the
various states, including Wisconsin, have sought to protect against ac-
tions by the creditors.
The extent to which a homestead is protected depends entirely upon
legislative action. Early Wisconsin legislatures did not place any limit
upon the value of the homestead, but merely defined the quantum of
land involved.2 It was not until 1901 that the legislature saw fit to
amend the Homestead law by placing a limitation of $5,000 upon the
value of the homestead that would be exempt from execution.3 It
should be pointed out that the homestead was not protected against
laborer, mechanics, and purchase money liens, and mortgages and
taxes.4 Furthermore, the protection that was placed upon the home-
stead was extended to the proceeds derived from its sale to the extent
of $5,000, with which the debtor could purchase a new homestead. 5
Briefly what the Wisconsin legislature has protected from creditor ac-
tion is a quantum of land together with dwelling house and appurtances
claimed by the debtor as homestead, to the extent of $5,000. This pro-
tection extends not only to the estate but to the proceeds derived from
its sale, and which are to be used to replace it.
If the homestead protection terminated upon the death of the debt-
or, the legislative intent to protect the homestead would be of little
avail. However, by means of constitutional and statutory provisions,
most states have transmitted this protection to the widow and children
of the debtor." Therefore, the fact that the estate may be insolvent
does not destroy the right of the widow or of the deceased's children
to homestead even though the property to be set apart constitutes the
entire estate of the decedent.
In Wisconsin the interest of the widow and children in the home-
stead is protected, and under the statute, Section 237.02, the homestead
descends:
1 Bunker v. Locke, 15 Wis. *635, *638 (1862).
2Wis. Stat. 3835 (1898).
3 Wis. Session Laws, Chap. 269 (1901).
4 Wis. Stat., 272.20 (1945).
.Ibid.
621 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, 562-571 (1906).
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" . free of all judgments and claims against such deceased
owner or his estate except mortgages lawfully executed thereon
and laborer's and mechanics liens."17
The same statute provides that the limitation as to value in Section
272.20 does not apply as between the widow or widower and the issue.
By implication, therefore, this limitation would come into play only in
the event of action by the creditors of the deceased. It would seem that
the legislature, by this section, sought, in certain respects, to protect
the widow and children in the same manner as it did the debtor in Sec-
tion 272.20. Therefore, in the event of sale to satisfy mortgages and
mechanic's and laborer's liens, the widow or children would not be en-
titled to any of the proceeds therefrom until these incumbrances were
satisfied.
Where the value of the homestead is in excess of the statutory limi-
tation and the creditors involved do not fit into one of the above classifi-
cations, a difficult problem arises as to how the proceeds derived from
the sale should be distributed. The Wisconsin statutes are ambiguous
in this respect.
Prior to the passage of the present dower statute in 1921, it appears
that, in the event of the sale of the homestead, the widow had an elec-
tion between taking her dower interest or her homestead interest. The
question was presented as to what basis should be used in determining
the respective interests, and was answered by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in the case of Lands of Sydow." The litigants were the widow
and the son and the case involved a dispute over the distribution of the
proceeds ($7,000) derived from the sale of the homestead of the de-
ceased. After tracing the development of the limitation placed upon
the value of the homestead by the legislature in 1901, the court stated,
"... The statutory definition of the term 'homestead' applies as
well to the descent of land as to exemptions. . .The widow,
therefore has a homestead right in only $5,000. If she elects to
her dower interest therein, she can do so presently. . . Of
course her dower interest in the $2,000 which the homestead 40
yielded in excess of the $5,000 should be paid the widow now,
and the balance to the minor."
Therefore, it would appear that the proceeds were divided into two
distinct funds. The first fund represented the homestead as limited by
statute. In this fund, the widow (prior to 1921) had an election be-
tween her homestead or dower right therein. Upon the termination of
her widowhood, the remainderman was entitled to the fund or balance,
depending upon her election. The second fund represented the other
7Wis. Stat., 237.02 (1945).
s Lands of Sydow, 161 Wis. 325, 154 N.W. 371 (1915).
9 Ibid.
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real estate of which the deceased died seized. To this fund, the widow's
right of dower attached. The interest of the creditors of the deceased
was recognized only in the balance that remained after the dower was
deducted.
However, in 1921, the dower statute was amended to change the
dower interest to a fee in 1/3 of the lands of which the husband died
seized of an estate of inheritance." The statute was further amended
by adding,
"...But such widow shall have no dower in any homestead of
which her husband died seized, except in the proceeds thereof
in lieu of her homestead rights in case of sale of the premises
while she has homestead rights therein.""
It appears that it was intended by the statute that the new dower in-
terest should attach only to the proceeds in the event of the sale of the
homestead of the deceased. The question arises as to whether this in-
terest attaches to the entire proceeds derived from the sale, or whether
it attaches to only the amount limited by statute. In this connection, it
can be noted that the statute speaks of the proceeds of the homestead
and continues with, the phrase "sale of the premises."' 2 It does not say
"sale of the homestead." Therefore, it would appear that the legislature
intended to maintain the limitation as to value of the homestead in re-
spect to the widow's right to dower therein. If this is the correct con-
struction of this statute, then, by applying the rule laid down in the
case of the Lands of Sydow," the result would be substantially the
same as before the passage of the amendment of the dower statute.
The widow would have the right of dower in the fund representing the
homestead as limited by statute and the balance of that fund would be
held in trust for the remaindermen. Furthermore, the right of dower
would attach to the excess immediately and the balance would be ad-
ministered as part of the estate of the deceased. In other words, while
the widow would have homestead rights in the premises, this right
would only attach to so much of the proceeds that would represent the
value of the homestead as limited by the statute.
However, it appears that another construction of this statute is pos-
sible. Instead of interpreting homestead, as used in the dower statute,
to mean the homestead as limited by statute, it might well be interpreted
as it was in Bunker vs. Locke.14 In other words, the limitation as to
value would be eliminated. If the latter is a correct interpretation, then
it would appear that the right of dower attaches to the entire proceeds
10 Wis. Stat., 233.01 (1945).
"1 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
"3Lands of Sydow, 161 Wis. 325, 154 N.W. 371 (1915).
'1 Bunker v. Locke, 15 Wis. *635, *638 (1862).
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derived from the sale. The further question arises as to how much of
the proceeds must be set aside as the homestead interest of the children.
Here, it appears that two factors come into play. The first is the statu-
tory limitation of the value of the homestead, and the second is the life
expectancy of the widow. Sec. 237.022 defines the second factor as the
length of widowhood because her interest in the homestead is terminated
by remarriage.' 5 Since there is no practical way of determining this
time, it would seem that the life expectancy figure must be used. By
using this figure, it is possible to determine what sum drawing the stip-
ulated rate of interest will equal $5,000 at the end of that number of
years. This sum represents the children's homestead interest, and the
balance remaining after the dower and homestead interests are deducted
will be administered as part of the estate.
Which construction of the statute is correct seems open to debate.
The first construction seems to be more in line with the legislative policy.
As late as 1939, the Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated that the limi-
tation as to value of the homestead as set forth by the homestead statute
expressed the legislative intent to exempt property up to that value. 6
It is apparent that this limitation was placed for the benefit of the debt-
or's creditors. Therefore, if this limitation inures to the benefit of the
creditors before the death of the debtor, it should not be lost by such
death.
JOHN ROUILLER
'a Wis. Stat., 237.02 (1945).
16 Estate of McKenzie: Havitz v. McKenzie, 232 Wis. 425, 287 N.W. 695 (1939).
